The Metamorphosis of the Victim of Crime: From Crime to Culture and the Implications for Justice by Walklate, Sandra
www.crimejusticejournal.com	IJCJ&SD	2016	5(4):	4‐16	 	ISSN	2202–8005	
		
©	The	Author(s)	2016	
The	Metamorphosis	of	the	Victim	of	Crime:	From	Crime	
to	Culture	and	the	Implications	for	Justice	
Sandra	Walklate	
University	of	Liverpool,	United	Kingdom;	Queensland	University	of	Technology,	Australia	
	
	
	
Abstract	
Beck	(2015:	81)	observes,	metamorphosis	 ‘is	proceeding	 latently,	behind	the	mind	walls	of	
unintended	 side	 effects,	 which	 are	 being	 constructed	 as	 ‘natural’	 and	 ‘self‐evident’.	 Thus	
Beck’s	 concept	 of	 metamorphosis	 conceives	 of	 social	 change	 as	 unnoticed	 and	
unacknowledged.	Such	change	is	evident	in	the	contemporary	ever	present	invocation	of	the	
‘victim’	in	a	wide	range	of	different,	crime‐soaked	circumstances.	This	paper	is	concerned	to	
explore	 this	 metamorphosis	 of	 the	 ‘victim’	 in	 reflecting	 on	 two	 narratives:	 the	 victim	
narrative	and	the	trauma	narrative.	The	contemporary	conflation	of	these	two	narratives	has	
led	Agamben	(1999:	13)	to	suggest	that	policy	has	proceeded	as	if	‘“testis”	(the	testimony	of	a	
person	as	a	 third	party	 in	a	 trial	or	a	 law	suit)	can	be	conflated	with	“superstes”	 (a	person	
who	has	lived	through	something	and	can	thereby	bear	witness	to	it)’.	The	paper	makes	the	
case	that	this	conflation	has	consequences	for	understandings	of	justice.	
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Introduction	
In	 the	 summer	of	2015,	 the	Western	media	 carried	 the	picture	of	a	 three‐year‐old	boy,	Aylan	
Kurdi,	 found	 drowned	 on	 a	 Turkish	 beach,	 having	 been	washed	 overboard	 from	 the	 boat	 on	
which	he	and	his	Syrian	family	were	endeavouring	to	escape	from	Syria	to	Europe.	At	the	time	
this	 image	 had	 a	 profound	 effect	 on	 the	 politics	 surrounding	 responses	 to	 the	migrant	 crisis	
occurring	 during	 the	 summer	 of	 2015	 consequent	 to	 the	 conflict	 in	 Syria.	 The	 purpose	 in	
presenting	it	here	is	not	to	engage	in	a	discussion	of	the	rights	and	wrongs	of	that	crisis	but	to	
point	to	the	use	of	this	image	as	a	depiction	of	victimhood	and	the	effects	that	it	had.	Of	course,	
it	 is	 without	 doubt	 that	 this	 young	 child	 was	 a	 victim.	 Moreover	 it	 is	 without	 doubt	 that	 he	
constituted	an	 ‘ideal	victim’	in	every	sense	of	that	term	intended	by	Christie	(1986).	However,	
what	 are	 perhaps	 less	 visible	 are	 the	 processes	 behind	 the	 contemporary,	 and	 apparently	
acceptable,	 use	 of	 an	 image	 of	 this	 kind	 in	 a	wide	 range	 of	media	 outlets.	 Awareness	 of	 this	
raises	a	number	of	questions	the	most	pressing	of	which	is,	arguably,	how	and	why	victimhood	
has	come	to	occupy	the	kind	of	position	that	 it	does	 in	 informing	cultural,	political	and	policy	
responses	to	a	wide	range	of	social	problems,	from	mass	migration	to	domestic	violence;	from	
the	 global	 to	 the	 local	 to	 the	 interpersonal.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 reflect	 on	 these	
processes	through	the	lens	of	victimology;	to	consider	the	extent	to	which	the	discipline	is	itself	
well	enough	equipped	to	address	concerns	such	as	these;	and	to	ask	some	hard	questions	about	
what	 this	 centring	 of	 the	 victim	 in	 this	 way	 implies	 for	 understandings	 of	 justice.	 Put	 more	
simply,	 as	 Fassin	 (2012:	 29)	 asks,	 ‘What	 are	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	 representation	 of	 the	
world	through	pain?’	
	
In	 order	 to	 do	 this	 the	 paper	 falls	 into	 three	 parts.	 The	 first	 reflects	 on	 the	 contemporary	
centring	of	victimhood	through	considering	the	presence	in	two	narratives:	the	victim	narrative	
and	 the	 trauma	 narrative.	 The	 second	 considers	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Alexander’s	 (2012)	
articulation	of	trauma	as	a	master	narrative	casts	light	on	the	metamorphosis	of	the	victim	that	
centres	victimhood	and	conflates	victimhood	with	trauma.	The	third	and	final	part	of	the	papers	
reflects	on	the	consequences	of	this	conflation	for	policy	and	politics	and	focuses	in	particular	
on	 questions	 of	 justice.	 Arguably,	 it	 is	 in	 this	 arena	 that	 the	 unintended	 consequences	 of	 the	
metamorphosis	of	the	victim	are	being	most	keenly	felt.	First	of	all,	however,	it	will	be	of	value	
to	say	something	about	the	victimological	lens	through	which	these	issues	are	being	considered.	
	
On	victimology	
Victimology	emerged	as	 a	 sub‐discipline	of	 criminology	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Second	World	
War.	The	‘Founding	Fathers’	of	this	sub‐discipline	were,	on	the	one	hand,	concerned	to	correct	
the	offender	focus	of	criminology,	arguing	that	any	crime	involved	a	‘doer‐sufferer’	relationship	
(a	victim	and	an	offender;	see	the	work	of	von	Hentig	1948)	and,	on	the	other	hand,	puzzled	by	
the	Holocaust,	wanted	to	develop	an	area	of	investigation	that	would	help	make	sense	of	such	
mass	 atrocities	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 victim	 within	 them	 (Mendelsohn	 1956).	 These	 early	
interventions	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 two	 key	 concepts:	 victim	 precipitation	 and	 victim	
proneness	 which	 subsequently	 framed	 the	 emergence	 and	 dominance	 of	 what	 came	 to	 be	
recognised	as	positivist	victimology.	(See	McGarry	and	Walklate	2015,	chapter	one	for	a	 fuller	
discussion	of	the	variegated	nature	of	victimology;	and	also	see	O’Connell	2008.)	This	version	of	
victimology,	 emulating	 her	 sister	 discipline	 of	 criminology,	 became	 pre‐occupied	 with	
measuring	 the	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 criminal	 victimisation	 and	 the	 impact	 that	 such	
victimisation	has	on	people.		
	
The	dominance	of	what	might	be	considered	to	be	a	‘quixotic	quest	for	standardized	measures	
in	 victimization’	 (Spencer	 and	 Walklate,	 forthcoming,	 2016)	 rests	 on	 the	 problematic	
assumptions	 that	 what	 people	 may	 experience	 as	 victimisation	 may	 never	 match	 with	 legal	
definitions	 of	 such	 (Spencer	 2011),	 overlaid	 by	 some	 confusion	 of	 what	 is	 actually	 being	
measured	by	the	victim	surveys	so	favoured	by	positivism.	Fattah	(2010:	51)	asks:	
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Is	 their	 objective	 to	 measure	 those	 criminal	 victimizations	 that	 meet	 the	 legal	
criteria	 set	 by	 the	 criminal	 code,	 or	 are	 they	meant	 to	measure	 the	 subjective	
victimizations	experienced	by	 the	 respondents?	These,	needless	 to	say,	are	 two	
different	realities.	In	other	words,	are	the	surveys	designed	to	measure	crime	or	
victimization?		
	
Such	issues	notwithstanding,	much	effort	has	been	invested	in	this	approach	in	making	sense	of	
victimhood.	 Effort	 that	 has	 yielded	 a	 range	 of	 secondary	 concepts	 like,	 for	 example,	 indirect	
victimisation,	secondary	victimisation,	and	so	on.	These	developments,	alongside	the	emergence	
of	a	wide	range	of	voluntary	organisations	and	support	groups	intent	on	ameliorating	the	worst	
effects	 of	 being	 a	 victim,	 form	 the	 dominant	 bedrock	 of	 what	 is	 known	 about	 crime	 and	 its	
impact.	 These	 academic	 and	 practitioner	 voices	 all	 occupy	 the	 space	 called	 victimology	 and,	
taken	together,	inform	what	might	be	called	a	‘victim	narrative’	discussed	more	fully	below.	
	
In	 an	 analysis	 concerned	 with	 issues	 that	 somewhat	 pre‐date	 the	 emergence	 of	 positivist	
victimology,	 Fassin	 and	 Rechtman	 (2009)	 document	 what	 they	 call	 ‘psychiatric	 victimology’.	
This	 version	 of	 victimology	 emanated	 from	 an	 appreciation	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 trauma	 first	
articulated	 in	 the	work	of	Charcot	 in	 the	1850s.	Trauma	as	a	concept	has	a	 range	of	different	
usages,	from	the	medical	to	the	psychological	to	the	psychic	(and	as	shall	be	developed	below,	
the	 social).	 However	 Fassin	 and	 Rechtman	 (2009)	 were	 particularly	 interested	 in	 the	
intertwining	of	the	intellectual	appreciation	of	trauma	with	its	adoption	within	a	particular	area	
of	 professional	 expertise:	 psychiatry.	 This	 intermeshing	 was	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 war‐time	
experience,	particularly	the	First	World	War,	and	then	latterly	the	Vietnam	War.	In	each	of	these	
contexts	the	concept	of	trauma	acquired	an	added	moral	dimension	concerned	with	how	to	deal	
with	‘malingerers’	in	the	case	of	the	First	World	War,	and	how	to	justify/explain	the	recourse	to	
excessive	violence	in	the	Vietnam	War.		
	
So,	rather	like	positivist	victimology,	this	psychiatric	victimology	was	concerned	with	the	harm	
done	 to	 individuals	 (and	 latterly	 collectivities)	 by	 experiences	 that	 fractured	 the	 routine	
patterns	of	everyday	life	on	which	people	rely	but,	 in	the	case	of	psychiatric	victimology,	such	
experiences	were	not	necessarily	tied	to	what	was	considered	to	be	legal	or	illegal.	In	addition,	
as	 shall	 be	 seen,	 psychiatric	 victimology	 was	 also	 implicitly	 embraced	 by	 voluntary	
organisations	 and	 campaign	 groups	 wanting	 the	 pain	 of	 those	 who	 they	 represented	 to	 be	
recognised	and	responded	to.	Thus,	this	psychiatric	focus	on	harm	forms	the	backcloth	against	
which	it	is	possible	to	trace	what	might	be	called	a	‘trauma	narrative’.	
	
Interestingly	these	two	narratives	are	tied	together	by	their	different	pre‐occupation	with	what	
Sennett	(1998:	44)	might	understand	as	the	central	importance	of	routine	for	everyday	life.		
	
To	 imagine	 a	 life	 of	 momentary	 impulse,	 of	 short‐term	 action,	 devoid	 of	
sustainable	 routines,	 a	 life	 without	 habits,	 is	 to	 imagine	 indeed	 a	 mindless	
existence.		
	
The	disruption	of	 criminal	victimisation	and/or	a	 traumatic	experience	centres	a	 ‘life	without	
habits’	into	which	each	of	the	narratives	discussed	below	offers	a	different	insight.	In	addition	it	
is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 these	 two	 narratives	 co‐existed	 –	 arguably	 in	 somewhat	 separate	
spheres	of	endeavour	–	until	the	late	1960s.	At	this	moment	in	history	it	is	possible	to	trace	the	
beginnings	of	the	metamorphosis	of	the	victim	and	arguably	of	victimology,	even	perhaps	that	
of	 trauma	 studies,	 alongside	 one	 another.	 This	metamorphosis	moved	 each	 of	 these	 areas	 of	
concern	 from	 their	 separable	 and	 separate	 pre‐occupations	 to	 ones	 in	which	 their	 respective	
contributions	 to	 making	 sense	 of	 the	 harm	 done	 to	 individuals	 and/or	 collectivities	 became	
conflated	one	with	the	other.	In	order	to	elucidate	this	conflation,	each	of	these	narratives,	the	
victim	narrative	and	the	trauma	narrative,	will	be	discussed	in	turn.	First	discussed	in	McGarry	
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and	Walklate	 (2015),	 in	 many	 ways	 the	 separation	 of	 these	 two	 narratives	 in	 this	 way	 is	 a	
heuristic	device	only,	as	shall	become	apparent.	
	
The	victim	narrative	
The	development	and	refinement	of	 the	criminal	victimisation	survey	in	the	 late	1960s	added	
considerable	impetus	to	the	emerging	sub‐discipline	of	victimology.	The	data	generated	by	this	
survey	method	gathered	momentum	during	the	1970s	and	1980s,	culminating	in	the	production	
of	 not	 only	 national	 criminal	 victimisation	 survey	 data	 but	 also	 similar	 data	 gathered	
internationally.	Despite	the	problems	inherent	in	this	method	of	data	gathering	(as	discussed	in	
considerable	 detail	 by	 Hope	 2007),	 such	 data	 have	 afforded	 remarkable	 insights	 into	 the	
patterning	of	 criminal	 victimisation	 and	 its	 effects	 across	a	wide	 range	 of	 jurisdictions.	 It	has	
also	 constituted	 the	 bedrock	 of	 positivist	 victimology	 and	 spawned	 a	 range	 of	 concepts	with	
which	 to	understand	 the	 impact	 that	 victimisation	has	on	people.	Understandings	of	primary,	
secondary	and	indirect	victimisation	all	owe	their	origins	to	the	sophisticated	development	and	
widespread	use	of	criminal	victimisation	survey	data.	In	order	to	appreciate	the	nature	of	this	
victim	narrative	it	will	be	useful	to	say	a	little	about	each	of	these	conceptual	developments	in	
turn.	
	
Primary	victimisation	refers	to	the	direct	impact	that	being	a	victim	(of	crime)	has.	Such	impacts	
are	many	a	varied	and	are	usefully	listed	by	Hall	and	Shapland	(2007:	3‐4).	They	can	range	from	
the	 loss	 experienced	 as	 a	 result	 of	 burglary	 to	 the	 post‐traumatic	 stress	 reported	 by	 some	
victims	of	rape	(an	important	 link	with	the	trauma	narrative	discussed	below).	These	 impacts	
can	also	vary	by	individual	depending	upon	what	else	might	be	going	on	in	their	lives	(Maguire	
and	Bennett	 1982),	 the	 extent	 to	which	 their	 sense	 of	 identity	 has	 been	 spoiled	 (Kearon	 and	
Leach	 2000),	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 victimisation	 itself	 (see	 for	 example	Hagan	 and	 Rymond‐
Richmond	(2009)	on	genocide	in	Dafur).	So,	primary	victimisation	is	hugely	variable,	contingent	
on	 individual	coping	strategies,	 their	persona,	personal	 relationships,	and	 the	kind	of	 support	
received.	The	nature	of	the	response	received	affords	one	link	between	primary	and	secondary	
victimisation.		
	
Much	 work	 emanating	 from	 the	 victim	 narrative	 has	 paid	 attention	 to	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
experiences	of	criminal	justice	systems	can	add	a	further	layer	to	the	harm	already	experienced.	
This	is	secondary	victimisation	and	has	been	well	documented	for	victims	as	witnesses,	families	
of	murder	victims	(Rock	1998),	families	of	serious	offenders	(Condry	2007),	those	subjected	to	
wrongful	convictions	(Jenkins	2013),	and	many	other	disparate	groups.	Sometimes	experienced	
as	 re‐victimisation	 (Dunn	 2007),	 this	 concern	 with	 secondary	 victimisation	 has	 extended	 its	
focus	 to	 those	 professionals	 charged	 with	 responding	 to	 difficult	 circumstances	 (see	 for	
example,	Dekker	2013;	Ullstrom	et	al.	2014).	 Interestingly	some	commentators	have	begun	to	
refer	to	secondary	victimisation	as	trauma	(see	inter	alia	Gekoski	et	al.	2013),	an	issue	to	which	
I	will	return.	Finally	the	concept	of	‘indirect	victimisation’	has	the	capacity	to	move	beyond	the	
direct	impact	of	victimhood	on	the	individual	or	collectivity	to	the	wider	more	disparate	effects	
that	 such	 events	might	 have	 on,	 for	 example,	 those	who	 share	 in	 the	 same	 ‘subject	 position’	
(Spalek	2006),	who	are	part	of	a	wider	community	of	affects	(viz	the	2004	bombing	in	Madrid	
(Burkitt	 2005)	 or	 the	 reverberations	 of	 9/11	 and	 other	 events	 given	 widespread	 media	
coverage	 afforded	 them,	 like	 the	 one	 with	 which	 this	 paper	 began)	 in	 which	 we	 are	 all	
potentially	victim/witnesses	(Howie	2012).	So	the	pre‐occupations	of	this	victim	narrative	have	
blossomed	from	understanding	the	nature	and	effect	of	criminal	victimisation	to	considering	the	
extent	to	which	those	effects	permeate	not	just	those	so	affected	but	also	resonate	on	the	wider	
community	and	society	at	large.	
	
Alongside	 the	 burgeoning	 evidence	 base	 of	 this	 victim	 agenda	 there	 has	 been	 a	 concomitant	
growth	in	victim‐centred	organisations	and	victim‐centred	policy.	Since	the	early	1970s	groups	
proclaiming	to	speak	for	the	victims	of	crime	have	grown	apace.	Such	growth	and	development	
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has	been	well‐documented	elsewhere	(see	inter	alia,	Barker	2007;	Ginsberg	2014;	McGarry	and	
Walklate	 2015;	 Rock	 2004;	 Walklate	 2007).	 The	 growth	 and	 development	 of	 these	 victims’	
voices	 has	 been	 aligned	with	 the	 increasingly	 powerful	 presence	 of	 neo‐liberalism	 (Ginsberg	
2014)	 first	 illuminated	 in	Garland’s	(2001)	masterly	analysis	of	 the	culture	of	control	and	the	
further	politicisation	of	 the	victim	as	 a	mode	of	 responsibilisation	 (see	also	Miers	1978).	The	
centring	 of	 neo‐liberalism,	 however,	 whilst	 still	 having	 some	 currency,	 does	 not	 adequately	
account	 for	 the	 contemporary	 diversity	 of	 such	 victims	 groups	 and	 voices,	 and	 the	 apparent	
ease	 with	 which	 they	 capture	 the	 ear	 of	 policy	 makers	 concerned	 with	 both	 national	 and	
international	agendas	(like	 the	 international	criminal	court:	 see	Krever	2014).	Neither	does	 it	
fully	 account	 for	 the	 capacity	 of	 some	 of	 these	 voices,	 in	 seeking	 the	 ‘truth’	 of	 what	 has	
happened	to	them,	to	revisit	the	past	through	the	knowledge	and	eyes	of	the	present	(see	inter	
alia,	 Lynch	 and	 Argomaniz	 2015;	 Scraton	 2009).	 Thus	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 observe	 a	 shift	 from	
victim	support	organisations	to	be	concerned	with	just	that	–	ensuring	appropriate	support	for	
people	 through	 difficult	 times	 and	 pressurising	 for	 appropriate	 policy	 implementation	 to	
complement	 such	 support	 –	 to	 having	 been	 transformed,	 behind	 our	 backs	 (qua	 Beck	 2015),	
into	an	important	conduit	for	seeing	the	world	through	the	prism	of	pain	(Fassin	2012).	It	is	at	
this	 juncture	 that	 it	 will	 be	 useful	 to	 turn	 to	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 second	 narrative	 to	 be	
considered	here:	the	trauma	narrative.	
	
The	trauma	narrative	
As	has	already	been	intimated,	the	term	‘trauma’	carries	a	number	of	different	meanings,	from	
the	medical	 to	 the	 psychological.	 Its	 development	 as	 a	 psychic	 concept	 has	 its	 origins	 in	 the	
work	of	Charcot	 in	 the	1860s.	Differently	understood	as	either	 the	result	of	an	external	event	
(Charcot’s	understanding)	or	the	result	of	an	internal	psychic	problem	(Freud’s	understanding),	
it	has	gone	on	to	be	a	term	used	as	a	metaphor	to	capture	the	effects	of	anything	regarded	as	
unpleasant	(Hacking	1995).	The	intention	here	is	not	to	document	the	extensive	work	done	on	
trauma	and	its	uses	but	to	offer	a	flavour	of	the	way	in	which	it	has	been	deployed	in	the	context	
of	criminal	victimisation.	Indeed	it	is	through	the	conduit	of	what	Fassin	and	Rechtman	(2009)	
have	 called	 ‘psychiatric	 victimology’	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 trace	 the	presence	 of	 trauma	 in	 the	
sub‐discipline	of	victimology.	This	presence	can	be	found	in	a	number	of	inter‐related	and	inter‐
locking	paths.	One	notable	route	has	been	feminism.	
	
Historically	positivist	victimology	and	feminism	have	not	sat	easily	with	one	another	(see	inter	
alia	Davies	2011;	Rock	1994;	Walklate	2003).	One	of	the	tensions	between	these	two	frames	of	
reference	 lies	 within	 understanding	 the	 nature,	 extent	 and	 impact	 of	 sexual	 violence	 on	
women’s	 everyday	 lives.	 Nonetheless,	 when	 Burgess	 and	 Holmstrom	 (1974)	 published	 their	
work	evidencing	a	 ‘rape	 trauma	syndrome’,	 it	was	hugely	 important	 in	challenging	 the	notion	
that	 ‘no	 harm	 was	 done’	 by	 such	 violence.	 The	 recognition	 of	 this	 syndrome	 afforded	 an	
important	 impetus	 to	 the	 feminist	 movement	 in	 their	 campaign	 at	 that	 time	 to	 secure	 the	
recognition	 of	 the	 pain	 of	 sexual	 violence	 across	 a	 range	 of	 different	 criminal	 justice	
jurisdictions.	 The	 influence	 of	 what	 Rose	 (1998)	 has	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘psy’	 disciplines,	 in	
ensuring	that	the	impact	of	sexual	violence	is	taken	seriously,	has	subsequently	been	profound.	
Contemporarily	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	 deny	 that	 rape/sexual	 violence	 can	 have	 a	 negative	
impact	on	both	men	and	women.	Through	this	route	then,	the	language	of	trauma	entered	the	
world	of	understanding	 the	 impact	of	 criminal	victimisation.	The	presence	of	 this	 language	 in	
relation	to	women’s	experiences	of	sexual	violence	in	particular	has	not	been	and	is	not	without	
its	problems	however.	For	example,	Gavey	and	Schmidt	(2011:	439)	observe:	
	
…	 a	 universalising	 presumption	 of	 ‘no	 harm	 done’	 to	 an	 equally	 universalising	
presumption	 of	 ‘severe	 harm	 done’	 …	 irrespective	 of	 the	 woman’s	 own	 views	
about	its	place	in	her	life.	
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Perhaps	 even	more	 perturbing	 is	 the	 tendency	 to	 declare	 the	woman	 (or	 the	man)	 in	 denial	
should	s/he	counter	the	assignation	of	being	‘traumatised’	which,	of	course,	‘traumatised’	s/he	
must	be	in	order	to	be	believed	in	terms	of	a	criminal	justice	response	(see	inter	alia	Brown	and	
Horwath	 2009).	 It	 is	 at	 this	 juncture	 that	 the	 tensions	 between	 the	 power	 of	 a	 positivist	
victimology	and	its	implicit	use	of	the	term	‘victim’	as	a	uniform	and	unifying	concept,	and	the	
individualised	nature	of	trauma	as	actually	lived	and	experienced,	are	felt.	It	is	at	this	meeting	
point	that	it	is	possible	to	discern	the	transference	of	the	trauma	discourse	to	other	categories	
of	victimisation.	In	this	regard	Summerfield	(1999:	1449)	has	observed:	
	
One	of	the	features	of	20th	century	Western	culture	–	particularly	in	the	last	50	
years	–	has	been	the	way	medicine	and	psychology	have	displaced	religion	as	the	
source	 of	 explanations	 for	 the	 vicissitudes	 of	 life,	 and	 of	 the	 vocabulary	 of	
distress.	
	
The	slippage	in	terminology	between	primary,	secondary,	indirect	victimisation	commented	on	
above	and	the	presence	of	the	concept	of	trauma	in	this	slippage	–	albeit,	to	begin	with,	used	in	
the	 context	 of	 rape	 –	 is	 one	 illustration	 of	 this	 ‘vocabulary	 of	 distress.’	 There	 is,	 however,	 a	
second	 point	 of	 intersection	 in	 the	 development	 of	 understandings	 of	 trauma	 in	 the	 ‘psy’	
disciplines	 and	 the	 use	 of	 this	 concept	 in	 the	 context	 of	 criminal	 victimisation.	 This	 point	 of	
intersection	lies	in	the	recognition	of	post‐traumatic	stress	disorder.	
	
Chamberlin	 (2012:	 362)	 comments	 that	 the	 Diagnostic	 and	 Statistical	 Manual	 of	 Mental	
Disorders	 (DSM‐III),	published	in	1980,	brought	the	category	of	post‐traumatic	stress	disorder	
(PTSD)	into	psychological	and	popular	discourse.	The	kinds	of	events	that	could	result	in	PTSD	
included	such	experiences	as	being	a	victim	of	violent	assault,	 to	being	kidnapped,	 to	being	 a	
victim	 of	 a	 terrorist	 attack	 or	 a	 natural	 disaster.	 The	 recognition	 of	 this	 disorder	 meant	
acceptance	of	the	veracity	of	victims	in	distress.	The	publication	of	DSM‐III	coincided	with	the	
concerns	 of	 the	 (American)	 feminist	 movement	 (qua	 Burgess	 and	 Holstrom’s	 1974	 work	
referenced	above)	alongside	the	presence	of	the	(American)	peace	movement	(Herman	1992).	
Taken	 together	 this	 resulted	 in	 a	 ‘new	 era	 of	 thinking	 about	 trauma’	 (Fassin	 and	 Rechtman	
2009:	 77).	 Thus	 ‘suffering	 is	 no	 longer	 something	 that	 should	 be	 hidden	 from	 others	 or	
concealed	from	oneself:	it	is	something	that	can	be	legitimately	described	in	others	and	oneself’	
(Fassin	 2012:	 41‐42).	 To	 see	 the	 world	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 pain,	 shared	 with	 others	 and	
recognised	 in	 these	 terms	 by	 others,	 became	 legitimate.	 It	 will	 be	 of	 value	 to	 explore	 the	
presence	of	the	peace	movement,	commented	on	by	Herman	(1992)	in	a	little	more	detail	since	
hidden	in	here	is	another	link	with	the	sub‐discipline	of	victimology	and	the	rising	presence	of	
victims’	voices.	
	
The	 peace	movement	 commented	 in	 by	Herman	 (1992)	 had	 as	 its	 focus	 the	Vietnam	War.	 In	
particular,	Alexander	(2012)	reminds	us	that	the	‘Mai	Lai	Massacre’	of	1968	sent	shock‐waves	
around	the	United	States.	That	massacre	prompted	serious	questions	to	be	asked	about	not	only	
how	 ordinary	 men	 could	 commit	 such	 awful	 atrocities	 but	 also	 threw	 into	 doubt	 American	
engagement	with	the	war	itself.	The	questions	posed	by	the	behaviour	of	American	soldiers	in	
Vietnam	were	not	dissimilar	to	those	posed	by	the	trial	of	Adolf	Eichmann	that	also	took	places	
in	the	1960s.	The	international	silence	on	the	discovery	of	the	concentration	camps	during	the	
early	 post	 war	 years	 could	 not	 be	 sustained	 during	 Eichmann’s	 trial	 in	 Jerusalem.	 Karstedt	
(2010)	has	commented	on	the	telling	absence	of	the	victims’	voices	of	the	Holocaust	in	the	post	
war	 years.	 Coupled	 with	 Arendt’s	 (1965)	 commentary	 on	 Eichmann’s	 trial	 in	 which	 she	
describes	 the	 ‘banality	 of	 evil’,	 considerable	 consternation	 was	 provoked	 concerning	 the	
capacity	of	democratic	 societies	 to	 engage	 in	 such	atrocities.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	Mai	Lai	 such	
concerns	were	particularly	profound	in	the	United	States.	Thus	underpinning	the	recognition	of	
PTSD	also	lay	a	way	of	making	sense	of	the	atrocities	of	war.	Such	atrocities	were	a	product	of	
the	trauma	experienced	by	individuals	in	the	face	of	the	threats	posed	by	war.	This	was	also	an	
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issue	 that	 was	 a	 focal	 concern	 for	 Mendelsohn,	 one	 of	 the	 Founding	 Fathers	 of	 victimology.	
Having	 invented	 the	 term	 victimology,	 Mendelsohn	 (1976:	 17)	 went	 on	 to	 include	 in	 his	
definition	of	 the	victim	those	oppressed	by	 ‘caste,	social	class	or	political	affiliation,	up	to	and	
including	genocide	or	war	crimes’.	The	recognition	of	PTSD	assisted	in	putting	the	violence(s)	of	
war,	not	solely	those	perpetrated	by	soldiers,	squarely	into	the	victimological	frame.	
	
Taken	together	these	processes	not	only	contributed	to	an	understanding	of	the	experience	of	
trauma	as	reflected	in	DSM‐III	but	also	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	what	Alexander	(2012)	
has	called	‘cultural’	trauma.	As	a	result	enhancing	the	voices	of	those	impacted	by	the	ordinary	
and	everyday	experiences	of	crime	are	the	voices	the	Holocaust,	the	veterans	of	war	and	their	
victims,	 alongside	 those	working	within	 feminism.	During	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s,	 these	 voices	
were	 added	 to	 by	 those	 concerned	 about	 their	 victimisation	 because	 of	 their	 race,	 ethnicity,	
sexuality	 and	 identity.	 Indeed	 the	 ‘new	wars’	 of	 the	1990s	afforded	another	dimension	 to	 the	
voices	 of	 the	 traumatised.	 Moon	 (2009)	 observes	 that	 during	 this	 time	 war	 torn	 societies	
became	 constituted	 as	 traumatised	 collectivities	 in	 need	of	 therapeutic	 intervention	 (see	 also	
Fassin	2012).	Yet	this	embrace	of	trauma	too	is	not	without	its	problems.	Not	only	does	it	have	
the	potential	to	deny	how	individuals	might	actually	experience	what	has	happened	to	them	(as	
observed	 above	 in	 the	 context	 of	 sexual	 violence),	 but	 it	 has	 also	 increasingly	 embedded	 a	
conflation	in	terms	of	understanding	what	exactly	is	being	referenced:	a	traumatic	event	or	the	
traumatic	impact	of	an	event	(Eagle	and	Kaminer	2014).	These	two	problems	are	suggestive	of	a	
contemporary	 use	 of	 trauma	 as	 a	 uniform	 and	 unifying	 concept:	 something	 that	 we	 can	 all	
recognise	and	agree	upon	resonant	of	Alexander’s	(2012)	use	of	the	notion	of	cultural	trauma.	
Arguably	 this	 is	 an	 unintended	 consequence	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which,	 in	 being	 combined	 with	 a	
similarly	 undifferentiated	 use	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 victim,	 it	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 conflation	
observed	by	Agamben	(1999:	13)	in	the	use	of	testimony.		
	
To	summarise,	the	victim	narrative,	informed	by	concepts	emanating	primarily	from	positivist	
victimology,	leant	itself	easily	to	identifying	the	vulnerable	(the	elderly,	the	young,	the	frail,	and	
so	 on)	 on	whom	 it	 could	 be	 assumed	 that	 victimisation	would	 take	 its	 greatest	 toll.	 In	 some	
respects	 the	 trauma	narrative	 challenged	 this.	 In	 the	 trauma	narrative	 even	 those	 least	 likely	
considered	vulnerable	(soldiers	for	example)	could	find	themselves	suffering	as	a	result	of	their	
exposure	to	the	violence(s)	of	war.	Nonetheless	these	two	narratives	have	become	intertwined.	
Indeed,	 in	 this	 intermeshing	 of	 victimhood	 and	 trauma,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 observe	 (qua	 Fassin	
2012)	the	shift	from	pain	as	naturalistic	(as	given	by	the	data	of	criminal	victimisation	surveys)	
to	pain	as	ironic	(as	routine	and	a	possibility	for	all	of	us):	hence	we	can	all	be	seen	to	be	victims	
now	 (Furedi	 2002).	 Furthermore	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 an	 increasingly	mediated	world	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 suggest	 that	 we	 are	 all	 ever	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 being	 seen	 as	 victims	 through	
indirect	 victimisation,	 or	 the	 trauma	 of	 witnessing,	 as	 we	 are	 exposed	 to	 the	 constantly	 and	
perpetually	 available	 and	 unchanging	 images	 of	 atrocity	 (Pollard	 2011).	 In	 this	 melding	 of	
victimhood	 and	 trauma	 both	 terms	 are	 used	 as	 universal,	 unifying,	 and	 undifferentiated	
categories.	 Yet	 it	 is	 also	 the	 case	 that	 individuals	 recover	 from	bad	experiences	 and	have	 the	
capacity	 to	 deal	 with	 horrendous	 circumstances	 in	 a	 myriad	 of	 different	 ways.	 Nevertheless	
under	 conditions	 of	 what	 might	 be	 called	 ‘trauma	 creep’	 these	 capacities	 remain	 somewhat	
hidden	from	view.	It	will	be	of	value	to	examine	the	characteristics	of	this	trauma	creep,	and	its	
manifestation	within	concerns	about	the	victim	of	crime,	in	a	little	more	detail.	
	
Trauma	creep	
The	 work	 of	 Alexander	 (2012)	 offers	 one	 way	 in	 which	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 apparent	
convergence	between	the	victim	narrative	and	the	trauma	narrative	as	has	been	suggested	here.	
Whilst	his	work	is	primarily	concerned	to	understanding	how	The	Holocaust	achieved	the	status	
of	a	master	narrative	when	equally	atrocious	events	did	not	acquire	this	status,	his	delineation	
of	four	variables	that	need	to	be	present	for	a	master	narrative	of	trauma	to	emerge	are	worthy	
of	 some	 reflection.	 His	 four	 variables	 are:	 the	 kind	 of	 pain	 incurred;	 who	 the	 victim	 is;	 the	
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capacity	to	relate	the	victim’s	trauma	to	a	wider	audience;	and	the	attribution	of	responsibility	
for	 that	 pain	 (Alexander	 2012).	 In	 many	 ways	 these	 four	 variables	 have	 been	 increasingly	
present	for	the	victim	(of	crime)	from	the	mid‐1970s	through	to	the	early	1980s	to	the	present	
day.	 These	 include,	 the	 proliferation	 of	 the	 criminal	 victimisation	 survey	 and	 its	 associated	
findings	 documenting	 the	 pains	 of	 criminal	 victimisation;	 the	 evidence	 generated	 by	 those	
surveys	 of	 a	 relatively	 powerless	 victim	 (gendered,	 aged,	 classed	 and	 racialised);	 the	
proliferation	of	victim‐centred	organisations	making	claims	on	behalf	of	victims’	voices;	and,	in	
the	light	of	these	data	and	the	claims	of	these	organisations,	the	attribution	of	responsibility	to	
criminal	justice	practitioners	in	particular	and	systems	of	justice	more	generally	for	the	further	
pain	 endured	 by	 victims	 of	 crime.	 The	 recognition	 of	 rape	 trauma	 syndrome	 alongside	 the	
slightly	later	acceptance	of	the	veracity	of	the	victim’s	voice	in	the	acceptance	of	the	existence	of	
PTSD	and	 the	conflation	of	victimhood	with	 trauma	 is	established.	From	this	conjuncture	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 observe	 the	 increasingly	 diverse	 presence	 of	 voices	 claiming	 trauma	 as	 the	
conceptual	conduit	for	their	recognition.	Thus	the	metamorphosis	of	the	victim	is	complete.	Yet,	
is	 it?	 At	 this	 juncture	 it	 is	 worth	 considering	 some	 less	 visible	 consequences	 of	 this	 trauma	
creep.	
	
First	of	all,	and	a	point	well	made	by	Eagle	and	Kaminer	(2014),	 is	 the	recognition	 that	being	
distressed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 life	 threatening	 experience	 is	 a	 normal,	 psychologically	 healthy	
response	 rather	 than	 one	 that	 denotes	 a	 disorder.	 As	 was	 intimated	 above,	 the	 capacity	 of	
individuals	 and	 collectives	 to	 overcome	 even	 the	 worst	 excesses	 of	 violence	 are	 well	
documented.	 Trauma	 creep	 can	 silence	 this	 capacity.	 In	 claiming	 the	 status	 of	 ‘traumatised’,	
sometimes,	 of	 course,	 other	 things	 can	 follow,	 like	 for	 example,	 in	 post‐conflict	 societies,	
international	 aid.	 However	 the	 conflation	 of	 these	 two	 processes	 can	 rest	 on	 two	 further	
problematic	 assumptions	 both	 of	 which	 raise	 fundamental	 questions	 about	 the	 actual	 lived	
experiences	of	individuals.	Put	simply,	trauma	creep	in	conflating	the	victim	narrative	with	the	
trauma	narrative	 embraces	 the	 failures	 inherent	 in	 each	 of	 them	 in	making	 sense	 of	 people’s	
real	lives.	So	the	victim	narrative	fails	because	it	is	rooted	in	data	that	aggregate	individuals	into	
groups.	The	latter	does	not	necessarily	reveal	anything	about	the	former.	The	trauma	narrative	
fails	because	of	 the	 same	problem	 in	 reverse.	 It	 is	 generated	by	 in‐depth	data/experiences	of	
individuals	 that	 are	 used	 to	 make	 claims	 on	 behalf	 of	 groups.	 Hence	 the	 trauma	 creep,	
increasingly	endemic	 in	victim’s	voices,	has	the	capacity	to	do	a	disservice	to	both	 individuals	
and	collectivities	at	the	same	time.	The	question	remains,	of	course,	as	to	why	this	matters.	This	
returns	 us	 to	 the	 dilemma	 posed	 by	 Agamben	 (1999)	 concerning	 the	 contemporary	
appreciation	 of	 testimony	 and	 its	 relationship	 with	 understandings	 of	 justice.	 This	 is	 the	
problem	of	trauma‐driven	policy	and	politics.	
	
Trauma	driven	policy	and	politics	
The	 import	 of	 claims	 of	 trauma,	 either	 in	 popular	 terms	 (qua	 Laqueur	 2010)	 or	 as	 a	master	
narrative	 (qua	 Alexander	 2012),	 as	 clearly	 illustrated	 in	 the	 example	 with	 which	 this	 paper	
began,	cannot	be	denied.	In	political	and	policy	arenas,	whilst	neither	the	victim	narrative	nor	
the	 trauma	 narrative	 necessarily	 provides	 the	 evidential	 basis	 for	 action,	 both	 proceed	 as	
though	the	opposite	were	the	case.	The	response	to	the	death	of	Aylan	Kurdi	is	a	case	in	point.	
The	 interconnected	 nature	 of	 the	 events	 that	 unfolded	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 2015	 –	 and	 that	
continue	 to	 do	 so	–	more	 than	 illustrate	 the	 inherent	problems	 for	politics	 and	policy	driven,	
however	 justifiably,	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 trauma.	 Perhaps	 more	 prosaically,	 in	 terms	 of	
responding	 to	 individuals’	 experiences,	 trauma‐driven	 policies	 are	 problematic	 (as	 the	
discussion	above	concerning	rape	trauma	syndrome	implies)	because,	in	order	to	be	considered	
worthy	of	a	policy	or	practice	intervention,	an	individual’s	response	to	their	experiences	has	to	
be	pathologised.	This	is	rather	contrary	to	evidence	that	suggests	being	distressed	as	a	result	of	
a	life‐threatening	experience	is	normal	(Eagle	and	Kaminer	2014)	and,	indeed,	might	not	marry	
with	 the	 actual	 experiences	of	 the	 individual	 concerned.	However,	 only	when	 such	 responses	
are	 rendered	 abnormal	 is	 it	 then	possible	 to	 put	 in	 place	 a	 response	 to	 render	 them	normal.	
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Thus,	 in	 the	 convergence	 of	 the	 victim	 and	 trauma	 narratives,	 the	 normal	 is	 pathologised	 in	
order	for	intervention	to	normalise	that	which	has	been	deemed	to	be	pathological.	Moreover	–	
and	perhaps	even	more	importantly	–	within	these	processes,	some	‘pathologies’	are	rendered	
considerably	more	visible	than	others.	Indeed,	 in	conflict	ridden	societies,	as	with	the	anguish	
and	the	pain	of	migrants,	it	is	their	pain	that	is	abundantly	more	visible	and	rendered	suitable	
for	intervention	than	the	processes	that	lie	behind	their	pain.	It	is	against	the	backcloth	of	this	
politics	of	recognition	that	some	‘victim’	voices	are	listened	to	–	and,	indeed,	become	the	voices	
and	conduit	for	policy	changes	–	and	others	are	not.	In	the	shadows	in	between,	what	counts	as	
justice,	and	for	whom,	can	become	compromised.	
	
For	example,	in	a	recent	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	victims’	rights	and	neo‐liberalism	
in	 the	 United	 States,	 Ginsberg	 (2014)	 has	 observed	 a	 consonance	 between	 the	 two	 in	 their	
shared	denial	of	 society.	Rather	 like	Garland	 (2001),	he	uses	 the	 contemporary	propensity	 to	
name	laws	after	individual	victims	(as	opposed	to	those	who	proposed	them	or	wrote	them)	as	
illustrative	of	this	tendency.	This	propensity	is,	of	course,	not	peculiar	to	the	United	States.	The	
same	phenomenon	can	be	observed	in	a	range	of	Westocentric	jurisdictions,	in	which	not	only	
are	laws	named	after	individual	victims	but	such	laws	also	have	the	capacity	to	travel	from	one	
jurisdiction	 to	 another.	 Clare’s	 Law	 (the	 domestic	 violence	 disclosure	 scheme),	 adopted	 in	
England	 and	Wales	 in	 2014	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	murder	 of	 Clare	Wood	 by	 her	 partner	 in	
2009	and	in	the	face	of	a	vociferous	campaign	led	by	her	father,	was	introduced	in	Scotland	in	
2015	and	is	under	serious	consideration	in	states	of	Queensland	and	Victoria	in	Australia.	This	
is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 trauma‐driven	 policy	 with	 a	 poor	 evidential	 base	 but	 simultaneously	
pointing	the	finger	of	responsibility	for	preventing	her	death	in	the	direction	of	the	police	rather	
than	wider	 society.	 The	 influence	 of	 such	 victim	 voices	 in	 policy	 formation,	 often	with	 scant	
regard	for	the	wider	implications	for	justice,	is	not	unusual.	Individuals	have	been	appointed	as	
government	advisors	on	the	basis	of	their	experience	of	victimisation	as	though	their	experience	
stands	 for	 the	 experience	 of	 all	 victims.	 The	 appointment	 of	 Sarah	 Payne	 (the	 voice	 behind	
Sarah’s	Law	in	England	and	Wales)	as	a	Victims’	Champion	in	the	UK	or	the	recognition	given	to	
Rosie	Batty,	 a	 family	violence	campaigner	 (whose	11	year	old	son	was	killed	by	his	 father	on	
visiting	a	 junior	cricket	match	attended	by	her	and	her	son)	as	Australian	of	the	Year	in	2015,	
are	 two	good	examples	of	 the	presence	of	such	voices.	 Indeed	Schmidt	 (2014)	documents	 the	
persistence	of	some	of	these	voices	(in	her	case	study,	the	organisation	Mothers	Against	Drunk	
Drivers	in	the	United	States)	even	when	the	demands	of	their	cause	have	for	all	purposes	been	
met.	This	leads	her	to	introduce	the	concept	of	‘perpetual	trauma’:	a	notion	of	trauma	that	taps	
into	our	deepest	 fears	 (like	 the	 loss	of	 a	 loved	one)	and	 thus	demands	 constant	action	whilst	
simultaneously	 ensuring	 ‘victims	 voices	 become	 reshaped,	 packaged,	 commodified’	 (McEvoy	
and	Jamieson	2007:	425)	in	a	neatness	of	fit	with	neo‐liberalism.	
	
The	presence	and	influence	such	voices	are	neither	simple	nor	straightforward:	some	influence	
policy	on	the	back	of	sound	research	and	evidence;	the	influence	of	others	is	not	necessarily	so	
well‐founded.	Nonetheless,	the	nature	of	their	trauma	notwithstanding,	the	influence	that	such	
individuals	and/or	groups	may	assert	on	policy	and	the	subsequent	delivery	of	justice	are	highly	
contingent	on	who	hears	these	voices	and	under	what	conditions.	The	reverse	is	also	the	case.	
Not	all	voices	get	heard,	let	alone	acted	upon.	The	ongoing	denial	of	the	Armenian	genocide	by	
Turkey	might	constitute	a	good	case	in	point	(Rafter	and	Walklate	2012).	Yet	embedded	in	here	
is,	as	Agamben	(1999:	13)	observed,	a	process	in	which	‘policy	has	proceeded	as	if	‘“testis”	(the	
testimony	of	a	person	as	a	third	party	in	a	trial	or	a	law	suit)	can	be	conflated	with	“superstes”	
(a	 person	 who	 has	 lived	 through	 something	 and	 can	 thereby	 bear	 witness	 to	 it)’.	 This	 is	
captured	 in	 the	 title	of	a	 report	 recently	published	 in	 the	UK	by	 the	Criminal	 Justice	Alliance:	
Structured	Mayhem:	Personal	experiences	of	the	Crown	Court	(Jacobson,	Hunter	and	Kirby	2015).	
This	 report	 beautifully	 reflects	 the	 conflation	 of	which	Agamben	 speaks.	 Such	 commentaries,	
foregrounding	the	painful	experiences	of	some	of	those	people	required	to	attend	court	as	they	
do,	miss	 the	point	of	 justice.	 Justice,	with	all	 its	 faults,	 is	not	delivered	 just	 in	 the	 interests	of	
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those	who	participate	in	particular	cases	at	particular	points	in	time.	The	delivery	of	justice	is	in	
the	collective	interest,	participation	or	lack	of	it	notwithstanding.	Herein	lies	the	ultimate	threat	
of	trauma	creep.	This	threat	carries	implications	not	only	for	the	presence	of	victims’	voices	in	
national	 jurisdictions	 but	 also	 for	 the	 claims	 of	 the	 delivery	 of	 international	 justice	 (Krever	
2014).	
	
Some	concluding	thoughts	
Fassin	 and	 Rechtman’s	 (2009)	 analysis	 points	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 shift	 to	 viewing	 the	
world	through	pain	and	responding	to	those	in	pain	through	the	lens	of	trauma	is	not	only	silent	
about	the	kinds	of	victimisation	that	Mendelsohn	(1976)	so	desired	victimology	to	address	but	
it	 also	 actually	 hides	 the	 structural	 realities	 that	 constitute	 the	 environmental,	 political	 and	
moral	pre‐conditions	that	pre‐exist	the	pain	of	the	moment.	Yet	it	is	now	self‐evident	(qua	Beck	
2015)	 that	victimhood	and	 trauma	have	become	one	and	 the	 same.	Nonetheless	 it	 is	possible	
and,	 indeed,	 desirable	 to	 add	 to	 Fassin	 and	 Rechtman’s	 (2009)	 call	 for	 a	 moral	 economy	 of	
trauma,	 a	more	explicit	 call	 for	 a	political	 economy	of	 trauma.	 Such	a	 framework	would	pose	
important	questions	 for	not	only	 the	positivist	victimological	use	of	 the	concept	of	victim,	 the	
conflation	 of	 this	 concept	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 trauma,	 and	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 victim‐centred	
organisations	and	individuals	who	claim	to	speak	for	such	victims,	but,	crucially,	 it	would	also	
turn	 the	 spotlight	 on	how	criminal	 justice	policy	 is	 framed	and	developed	 in	 a	wide	 range	of	
jurisdictions,	particularly	Westocentric	ones.	Only	then	will	it	be	possible	to	truly	make	sense	of	
and	respond	to	the	tragedies	of	cases	like	Aylan	Kurdi.	It	is,	however,	a	moot	point	as	to	whether	
or	not	such	questions	will	be	heard.	
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